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Abstract
Extending the die rolling experiment of Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013), we com-
pare gender effects with respect to unethical behavior by individuals and by two-person
groups. In contrast to individual decisions, gender matters strongly under group decisions.
We find more lying in male groups and mixed groups than in female groups.
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1 Introduction
Unethical behavior is a ubiquitous feature in many economic contexts, and a number of recent
experimental studies have analyzed lying as one prominent type of unethical behavior. For
example, in Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013) individuals are asked to report the (privately
observed) realization of a die roll that determines their payoff. Evidence for lying (on the
aggregate level) is then obtained by comparing the actual payoff distribution with the uniform
distribution, which would result under truth-telling. Other studies have analyzed lying using
the sender-receiver setup of Gneezy (2005). All in all, there is strong evidence for lying, but
often not to the maximal extent possible; suggesting that there are private costs associated with
such unethical behavior (Gneezy, 2005; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Erat and Gneezy,
2012; Gibson, Tanner, and Wagner, 2013).
With respect to gender differences, it seems that males are somewhat more prone to lying
than females, but often the effect is small or not statistically significant (Dreber and Johannes-
son, 2008; Childs, 2012; Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Houser, Vetter, and Winter, 2012; Conrads,
Irlenbusch, Rilke, and Walkowitz, 2013; Conrads, Irlenbusch, Rilke, Schielke, and Walkowitz,
2014; Abeler, Becker, and Falk, 2014).1
So far, the literature on lying behavior has mainly analyzed decisions by individuals; possibly
in strategic interaction with other individuals as in tournaments (see e.g., Conrads, Irlenbusch,
Rilke, Schielke, and Walkowitz, 2014). However, in many settings, a group of individuals must
reach a decision jointly, e.g., decision-making by committees in economic, social, or political
organizations. In fact, there is growing evidence from contexts other than lying that groups
often decide markedly different than individuals (for surveys, see Charness and Sutter, 2012;
Kugler, Kausel, and Kocher, 2012). On the one hand, groups are better at solving cognitive
tasks and act more selfishly (see e.g., Maciejovsky, Sutter, Budescu, and Bernau, 2013; Born-
stein, Kugler, and Ziegelmeyer, 2004; Falk and Szech, 2013). That suggests that groups might
be more willing to realize the potential monetary gains from lying. On the other hand, there is
evidence that “moral reminders” reduce dishonesty (Pruckner and Sausgruber, 2013). Hence,
discussions within groups might lead them to lie less. Taken together, it seems a priori unclear
whether lying is more prevalent in groups compared to individuals. Moreover, for the lying
1For surveys on gender differences in a variety of economic contexts, see e.g., Eckel and Grossman (2008) and
Croson and Gneezy (2009).
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behavior of groups their gender composition might matter (see e.g., Dufwenberg and Muren,
2006, where gender composition affects groups’ giving in a dictator game). Consequently, this
paper aims at providing insights on the unethical behavior of groups and individuals, and
the role of gender in this context. Gender composition is found to be particularly important
under group decision-making. In our view, this has interesting implications for the design of
decision-making (and monitoring) processes in organizations.
2 Experimental Design
We extend the simple and widely used die rolling experiment of Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi
(2013), where subjects decide autonomously and anonymously about their (lying) behavior,
to a setting where decisions are made jointly in groups. We consider a treatment G where
randomly formed groups of two subjects need to coordinate on both who rolls the die and on
which realization to declare. As a control treatment I, we replicate the setup of decision-making
by individuals as in Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013). Subjects were randomly assigned to
treatments (and in treatment G, to groups).
The experiment was conducted at the University of Regensburg in June 2014. Participants
were recruited through an introductory undergraduate course in economics (economics majors
and minors and business majors).2 Subjects were first asked to complete an unrelated ques-
tionnaire inside the lecture hall. They were instructed (i) that their payoff for filling out the
questionnaire would be either 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 Euros, and (ii) that the exact amount would be
determined in a second phase of the experiment outside the lecture hall, where they would re-
ceive further instructions. We made it clear that payoffs would be completely independent from
their answers in the questionnaire, and that their behavior in the experiment would remain
anonymous.
The die rolling experiment was then played in paper-pencil style in fifteen booths outside
the lecture hall that ensured complete privacy of decision-making. Subjects waited inside
the lecture hall at their seats, and were only allowed to proceed outside when booths became
vacant. Inside the booth, subjects found a fair, six-sided die, a pen, instructions, an anonymous
answer sheet (on which the realization of the die roll was to be declared), and a receipt form
2As a show-up fee, students who agreed to participate (which all did) received a small bonus towards their
final exam.
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for each subject. Translations of the instructions and the answer sheet are included in the
Supplementary Material. As each booth contained one die and one answer sheet only, in
treatment G, subjects had to make a joint declaration, and they were aware that each of them
would receive the declared payoff.3 Afterwards, subjects proceeded to the cashier desk. They
handed in the anonymous questionnaire(s) and the anonymous answer sheet, where it was
checked that the declared amounts coincided with those on the receipt form(s). Then each
subject went to privately collect his/her payment. As in Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013),
subject i’s payment (in Euros) pii, is related to the declared outcome of the die roll r ∈ {1, ..., 6}
as follows: pii = r for all r ≤ 5 and pii = 0 for r = 6. In total, there were 228 participants (124
female, 104 male) of which 108 (120) participated in treatment I (G). The whole experiment
took about 2 hours.
3 Results
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of payoffs in the two treatments. In line with the previous
literature, a sizeable amount of lying also occurs in our setting. First, the average payoffs
in treatments G and I are 3.47 and 3.48, respectively. Hence, they virtually take the same
value (3.51) as in the baseline (individualistic) treatment of Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi
(2013). Both payoff distributions differ significantly from the uniform distribution that would
result under truthful reporting leading to an average payoff of 2.50 (p < 0.001, two-sided
one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests). These results are driven mainly by the high
frequency of reported 4’s and 5’s. Comparing our two treatments reveals that - when considering
all observations - their payoff distributions do not differ significantly at conventional levels
according to a two-sided Mann-Whitney U (MWU) test.4 However, as shown next, this result
masks substantial gender differences. As displayed in Figure 1(a), in treatment I, the average
payoff is somewhat higher for male subjects (3.58) than for female subjects (3.40), and both
gender-specific payoff distributions differ significantly from the uniform distribution (p < 0.001,
two-sided one-sample KS tests). Hence, females are somewhat less prone to lying than men, but
3As participants still had to read the instructions in the booth, they did not need to worry that the time
they spent there might be indicative of lying.
4Chytilova and Korbel (2014) conduct an artefactual field experiment on lying with children and adolescents
at a highschool, where participants were paid in sweets. Their three-person groups obtain a somewhat higher
payoff than individuals (3.28 and 2.93, respectively).
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Table 1: Summary of Payoffs
Treatment n pi pii = 0 pii = 1 pii = 2 pii = 3 pii = 4 pii = 5
I (all individuals) 108 3.48 .08−− .06−−− .09−− .19 .28+++ .31+++
I (females only) 58 3.40 .05−− .10 .09 .22 .22 .31+++
I (males only) 50 3.58 .10 .00−−− .10 .14 .34++ .32+++
G (all groups) 60 3.47 .05−− .10 .12 .17 .20 .37+++
G (female groups only) 19 2.74 .16 .11 .21 .11 .21 .21
G (male groups only) 13 4.00 .00 .08 .08 .15 .15 .54+++
G (mixed groups only) 28 3.71 .00−−− .11 .07 .21 .21 .39+++
Note: n and pi indicate the number of observations and the average payoff, respectively. A minus (plus) sign displays the
significance of a two-sided binomial test indicating that the observed relative frequency is smaller (larger) than 1
6
: − (+)
= 10%-level, −− (++) = 5%-level, −−− (+++) = 1%-level.
the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.477, two-sided MWU test). Based on own
calculations, this is again very similar to the baseline treatment of Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi
(2013), where the respective gender-specific values are 3.60 and 3.37 with p = 0.133.
The (slight) tendency of females to lie less than males is, however, amplified in treatment
G, where we observe groups that are either “female” (only females), “male” (only males),
or “mixed” (one female, one male). As illustrated in Figure 1(b), compared to treatment
I, the average payoff of female groups decreases (to 2.74), while the average payoff of male
and mixed groups increases (to 4.00 and 3.71, respectively). Payoffs of female groups are
significantly lower than payoffs of male groups or mixed groups (pair-wise two-sided MWU
tests with p = 0.045 and p = 0.059, respectively). The payoffs of male groups and mixed
groups are not significantly different from each other (two-sided MWU test, p = 0.497). A
Jonckheere-Terpstra test indicates that the extent of lying is lowest for female groups followed
by female individuals, male individuals, and male groups (p = 0.026, two-sided). In fact,
while the payoff distributions of both male groups and mixed groups differ significantly from
the uniform distribution, which would obtain under truthful reporting (two-sided one-sample
KS tests, each with p = 0.001), this is not the case for female groups (p = 0.311). That is,
in contrast to individuals (either female or male), male groups, or mixed groups, one cannot
reject that there is no lying in female groups.
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Fig. 1: Average payoffs. The dotted line indicates a payoff of 2.50, which would obtain on
average under truthful reporting.
There are also interesting gender differences with respect to the extent of lying, which we
study by looking at the relative frequencies of 4’s and 5’s.5 First, we compare the behavior
of male individuals and male groups, where similar fractions report either 4 or 5 (0.66 and
0.69, respectively). However, as illustrated by Figure 2, the fractions of male individuals who
report 4 respectively 5 are almost identical. In contrast, male groups more often report 5 (in
54% of cases) than 4 (in 15% of cases), where this difference is significant at the 10%-level of a
one-sided binomial test that presumes that 4 and 5 occur with equal probability (p = 0.0898).
Second, from comparing female individuals and female groups a different picture emerges. From
Figure 2, if anything, female groups are less likely to report 5’s than female individuals (and
in treatment I (G) one cannot reject that 4’s and 5’s are reported by equal fractions of female
individuals (female groups)). Finally, mixed groups seem to be more similar to male groups
than to female groups, as there are more 5’s than 4’s in mixed groups (where the p-value of a
respective one-sided binomial test is, however, only 0.1662).
5In principle, subjects might also lie to their own disadvantage. However, at an aggregate level, for pii ≤ 3
none of the frequencies reported in Table 1 are significantly above the truth-telling benchmark 1/6.
5
Male
individual
(treatment I )
Male
groups
(treatment G)
Female
individual
(treatment I )
Female
groups
(treatment G)
Mixed
groups
(treatment G)
10
20
30
40
50
P
er
ce
n
t
Fig. 2: Frequencies of 4’s (black color) and 5’s (white color) by gender and treatment.
4 Discussion
Many important economic, social, or political decisions are taken by groups rather than in-
dividuals. We investigate how gender affects unethical behavior in the form of lying. In line
with the previous literature, we find no clear evidence for gender differences under individual
decision-making on lying. In contrast, in the case of group decision-making, more pronounced
gender effects arise; resulting in more (less) aggregate unethical behavior in male (female)
groups. Moreover, male groups seem to have a greater tendency towards exploiting the full
gains from lying (i.e., securing the maximum payoff of 5) than female groups. Finally, mixed
groups with equal shares of males and females behave similarly to male groups. Hence, from
the viewpoint of organizational design, our results suggest that in contexts where unethical
behavior might be an issue, designers might want to pay particular attention to decisions that
are taken by purely male (or male-dominated) groups.
In future research, it would be interesting to study in more detail the forces underlying
our results. In this respect, it is well known from other experimental settings that culture and
cultural context might be important factors (see e.g., Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and
Zamir, 1991; Cox, Lobel, and McLeod, 1991; Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter, 2008). Cultural
context might also be of relevance in our context of unethical behavior, and at least the following
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two channels might be at work: First, in the light of the discussion in Section 1, culture
might influence how groups reach joint decisions as compared to individuals. For example,
culture might affect how much group members are concerned with their “image” relative to the
potential gains from acting dishonestly. Second, also gender differences in behavior might be
driven by cultural context. Again, such effects have already been documented in other settings
(see e.g., Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, and Satterfield, 2000; Gneezy, Leonard, and List,
2009), and they might also be relevant in the context of unethical behavior.
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Supplementary Material: Instructions and Answer Sheet
As Supplementary Material, we provide translated versions of the instructions (Section A) and
the answer sheet (Section B) provided inside the booths for treatment I. In square brackets,
we state the respective adjustments in the text for the two treatments I and G. The original
versions (in German) are available upon request.
To avoid waiting lines at the cashier desks, we had two of them marked with green and red
signs, respectively. We used otherwise identical, randomly allocated answer sheets and receipt
forms in these colors (in equal proportions) and asked subjects to go to the corresponding
color-coded cashier desk after they had completed the experiment.
A Instructions
Please read the entire instructions first before you roll the die!
For participating in this experiment [G : each of] you will receive a payoff.
For organizational reasons, the color of your documents determines at which cashier desk you
will receive your payoff: If your documents are in red, [G : both of] you may go to the red
cashier desk after finishing the experiment. If they are in green, then [G : both of] you may go
to the green cashier desk after finishing the experiment.
The payoff that [G : each of] you will receive will be determined by rolling a die:
Outcome of die roll 1 2 3 4 5 6
Payoff in Euros 1 2 3 4 5 0
[I : Please roll the die in front of you once.] [G : Please agree upon who of you will roll the
die in front of you once.] After that, please circle the outcome of the die roll and the related
payoff on the answer sheet. You are free to roll the die more than once, but only the first roll
is relevant for your payoff.
In a next step, we ask [G : each of] you to fill out and sign your receipt form (name and payoff)
in line with your entry on the answer sheet.
1
[G : Together] please submit all documents ([I : questionnaire, answer sheet, receipt] [G : both
questionnaires, answer sheet, receipts]) at the respective cashier desk. [G : Each of] you will
receive [I : your] [G : his/her] payoff there.
If you have any questions, please contact a member of the support team. If not, please roll the
die now.
Thank you for your participation!
B Answer Sheet
Please circle the combination of the outcome of the die roll and the corresponding payoff:
Outcome of die roll 1 2 3 4 5 6
Payoff in Euros 1 2 3 4 5 0
2
